This note discusses the meaning of interpretation, its main purpose, why courts interpret, and the scope of the law of interpretation.
In a previous note, it was pointed out that interpretation is the process of ascertaining the meaning of a text. The note also highlighted that the words used in a text can have multiple meanings. In this note, we will discuss these multiple meanings. These meanings include ordinary meaning, literal meaning, secondary meaning, fringe meaning, technical meaning, explicit meaning, implicit meaning, and implied meaning.
Courts often interpret documents such as wills, contracts, statutes, and even the Constitution. The essential question is: what authorises them to interpret these documents? In this note, we discuss the legal basis for interpreting the Constitution, statutory documents, and non-statutory documents.
In a previous note, it was highlighted that interpretation is not arbitrary; it is underpinned by rules. Those rules fall into four categories: basic rules, aids to interpretation, presumptions, and special and binding rules.
This note will discuss the basic rules for interpreting non-statutory documents, such as deeds, contracts, wills, and conveyances. The note begins by providing a brief overview of these non-statutory documents. It then discusses the rules for interpreting these documents, particularly those set out in Biney v Biney [1974] 1 GLR 318-336.
In a previous note, we discussed the rules governing the construction of non-statutory documents. One of the most common non-statutory documents is a will. In this introductory note, we will define a will, examine its ambulatory nature, and discuss the common terms associated with wills.
This note discusses the formalities of a valid will as contained in the Wills Act, 1971 (Act 360). The formalities to be discussed are: the requirement of writing, the testator's signature, and attestation by witnesses.
Section 6 of the Wills Act, 1960 (Act 360) makes special provisions for members of the armed forces in active service to make wills. These provisions are now discussed.
This note will focus on the cardinal rule for the construction of wills. Per this rule, he intention of the testator, as declared by him and apparent in the words of his will, must be given effect to, so far as, and as nearly as might be consistent with law
In this note, we will discuss the essential rules for constructing wills as set out in Section 7 of the Wills Act, 1971 (Act 360).
This note will discuss the following rules: 1. The courts are generally hesitant to adopt a construction that will defeat the intentions of the testator or defeat the will. 2. The intention of the testator is found in the actual words used by him. 3. In some instances, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid in the construction of a will. 4. Misdescriptions in a will do not invalidate the will. 5. Words and phrases are generally given their ordinary meaning, unless they are used in a technical sense or doing so will lead to absurdity. 6. In instances of inconsistent clauses, the general rule is that the latter or latest clause will prevail.
Under the common law, there are three distinct rules of statutory interpretation: the literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule. These three rules are now discussed.
In a previous note, we discussed the literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule as the three basic rules for statutory interpretation. Several approaches to interpretation have evolved from these three basic rules. These approaches are textualism, intentionalism, strict-constructionism or literalism, originalism, and the purposive approach. This note provides a quick overview of these approaches and discusses each in a subsequent note.
In a previous note, we provided an overview of various approaches to statutory interpretation. In the present note, we will discuss textualism as an approach to statutory interpretation. The note extensively discusses the meaning and scope of textualism, its variants, and its applicability in case law.
In a previous note, we provided an overview of various approaches to statutory interpretation. In the present note, we will discuss intentionalism as an approach to statutory interpretation. The note examines the meaning and scope of intentionalism, its applicability within the Ghanaian legal system, and some criticisms.
In a previous note, we provided an overview of approaches to statutory interpretation. In this note, we will discuss strict constructionism as an approach to statutory interpretation. The note examines the meaning and scope of strict constructionism, its differences from textualism, and its applicability within the Ghanaian legal system.
In a previous note, we provided an overview of approaches to statutory interpretation. In this note, we will discuss the purposive approach to the construction of statutes. The note will explain what the purposive approach means, how it is conceptualised by Francis Bennion and Aharon Barak, and its applicability in Ghana.
This note will briefly discuss the meaning of aids to interpretation, their role in interpretation, the provisions of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) regarding their use, and highlight the forms of aids to interpretation.
This note will briefly explain the meaning of internal aids to interpretation and highlight the major parts of statutory and non-statutory documents.
Non-statutory documents include contracts, wills, and conveyances, among others. These instruments contain operative and non-operative parts. In this note, we will discuss the various parts of non-statutory instruments. These parts are broadly divided into non-operative and operative parts. Under each of these parts, there are sub-parts that deal with distinct functions within the instrument and, collectively, aid in giving effect to the intention of the parties or the maker of the document.
Statutes consist of operative or enacting parts and non-operative parts. These parts, and the sub-parts they contain, may aid in the interpretation of the statute. This note will discuss the various parts of a statute and how they aid in interpretation.
This note will briefly explain what external aids to interpretation are, highlight some general external aids for the interpretation of the constitution and statutory and non-statutory documents, and highlight the external aids for the interpretation of statutory and non-statutory documents.
In a previous note, we highlighted the external aids to the interpretation of non-statutory documents. The aids highlighted were the contra proferentem rule, falsa demonstratio non nocet rule, expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil operatur maxim, and the expressum facit cessare tacitum maxim. This note discusses these aids in detail.
In a previous note, we highlighted the external aids to interpreting statutes and the Constitution. The aids highlighted were legislative history, contemporanea expositio, and the directive principles of state policy. This note discusses these aids in detail.
This note discusses various linguistic canons that aid the courts in construction. The linguistic canons to be discussed are expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, and ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
This note will discuss the meaning of a repeal, its types, and the two maxims of leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant and generalia specialibus non derogant. In a subsequent note, we will discuss the effects of repealed legislation under the common law and under the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792).
In a previous note, we discussed the meaning of a repeal and its various forms. In this note, we will discuss the legal consequences of a repeal under the common law and under the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792).
This note will define ouster clauses, its relationship with the jurisdiction of the courts, and outline their classification.
In a previous note, it was explained that a constitutional ouster clause is an ouster clause found or contained in the Constitution. In this note, we will discuss the effect of constitutional ouster clauses and highlight the various ouster clauses found in the Constitution, 1992.
This note briefly examines statutory ouster clauses, the forms they may take, and the effect of the 1992 Constitution on whether such clauses will be upheld and given effect by the courts.
A key topic under statutory ouster clauses is the ousting of the courts' jurisdiction in causes or matters affecting chieftaincy under Section 57 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459). This note will discuss Section 57 (supra), with particular focus on the meaning of causes or matters affecting chieftaincy and its effect on the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court.